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Abstract: This paper presents an analysis of the factors affecting foreign direct investments, focusing
on governance quality and adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards on countries
of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which are a special case of study due to their idiosyncratic characteristics, rich natural resources and geographical position. Panel data analysis was conducted,
implementing three different models (Fixed Effect, Random Effect, and Arellano Bond Dynamic
Model). The results show that the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards is a strong
determinant that promotes foreign direct investments. As regards the governance quality, the block
of Gulf Cooperation Council countries has fulfilled the minimum level of governance pre-conditions
relative to foreign direct investments. In addition, governance indicators associated with law, rules,
and corruption are more influential determinants for foreign direct investments.
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1. Introduction
The GCC1 is an important union of states that attracts the world’s attention because it
is one of the main producers of the world’s oil. Therefore, these states play a significant
role not only in the energy market but also in the global market. These states differ
from the developed and emerging countries. They are predominately segmented markets
and they are very sensitive to regional political events (Arouri and Rault 2010) while
their idiosyncratic characteristics are a special subject under the view of international
cooperation and convergence.
The union of GCCs was created in 1981 for political and economic cooperation aiming
at the integration and coordination of the member states in all fields. In 2003, GCCs created
a Custom Union, where they implement common custom tariff, while a monetary unionis
in the process. Moreover, all GCCs are members of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area
(GAFTA) and of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
International trade and foreign direct investments (FDI) are two of the main expressions of the globalization of the economy and the internationalization of firms. A great
part of the empirical research considers FDI and international trade to be complementary
(Büthe and Milner 2008; Marchant et al. 2002; Liu et al. 2001; Gopinath et al. 1999). However, international trade and FDI determinants are different across countries or regions
(Tintin 2013; Villaverde and Maza 2015) encouraging the view that the nature of FDI will
move more toward being a substitute rather than a complement to trade (Globerman 2017).
The choice of location is a crucial factor for foreign investments (Dunning and Lundan
1998). Although the GCCs are rich in natural resources, open to trade, and possess wealth,
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they attract less FDI, according to the report of IMF (2018). This remark raises concerns on
whether this area may be a friendly business environment under the view of the structural
components of the quality of governance and the financial environment. The efficient
adoption and implementation of a governance and accounting system is strongly associated
with the idiosyncratic characteristic of a country or a region (Shleifer and Vishny 1997;
Black et al. 2010; Márquez-Ramos 2011). Thus, two key issues are addressed in this study.
The first concerns the governance and the second the adoption of International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS). Governance and accounting systems (such as the IFRS) are
supplemented. The governance covers operational management and accounting covers
financials. Also, common principles guarantee good cooperation and understandability.
This paper builds on Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm and empirically investigates if there
exist location advantages throughout the GCC area. We simultaneously investigate governance and IFRS as potential location advantages in this area. We separate each influence in
order to evaluate which of them matters more to international investors and traders. This
paper makes essential contributions. First, it is an empirical analysis investigating to what
extent the OLI Paradigm can be used as a general model to capture particular characteristics
by encompassing institutional indicators. Second, it widens the current knowledge about
the GCCs, a region with global geopolitical and economic interests. GCCs’ economies have
gained little attention in empirical research while possessing accumulative wealth and
providing a different economic model compared to other countries rich in natural resources.
Last but not least, this region is a case study because it concentrates some characteristics
of a common market. Our results clearly demonstrate that the adoption of IFRS has a
significant impact on FDI. The governance quality has also a significant role, but empirical
findings indicate that the impact of IFRS is more significant, signifying that in the field of
governance, the GCCs have fulfilled the pre-conditions.
The rest of the study is organized as follows: In the following section, we present
the literature review. Section 3 presents the methodology and data description, Section 4
provides the empirical results, and Sections 5 and 6 consist of discussion and conclusions
respectively.
2. Literature Review
This paper builds on the theoretical framework of the OLI Paradigm (Dunning and
Lundan 1998). The Eclectic Paradigm explains the ownership, location, and internalization
advantages that may promote FDI. The ownership and internalization advantages are
associated with the micro-environment of a firm and its ability to develop intangible assets
such as innovation, technology, efficient management, etc. The location advantages refer
to the host country’s business environment, from which firms may gain some benefits
in their operational and productive activities (e.g., political and legal environment, tax
system, property rights, cheap labor, market size, etc.). This paper empirically analyzes
to what extent the OLI Paradigm can be served as a general model to capture the location
determinants of the FDI, focusing on factors associated with the operational and financial
management of firms.
Investors need to have a friendly business environment in order to take risks. Thus
the first concern is the quality of governance of the host country. Corporate governance
may promote economic relationships in terms of trade and investments as they guarantee
familiar and secure market environments (Khanna et al. 2006; Gani 2007; Adeoye 2009;
Lederman et al. 2013; Buchanan et al. 2012). Indeed, institutions of host countries influence
the choice of entry modes (Meyer 2001) as the multinationals’ choice of the entry type
depends on the governance quality of host countries (Slangen and Tulder 2009).
Some studies focused on the political regime provide evidence that democracies
promote FDI if certain terms are respected (Guerin and Manzocchi 2009; Asiedu and Lien
2011). However, Li (2009) argues that both democracies and autocracies may encourage or
discourage FDI, noticing that the frequent leadership turnovers are the deterrent factor for
attracting FDI.
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Empirical literature shows that GCCs have improved their governance quality and
gradually approach the international standards, even though their idiosyncratic characteristics are obvious. According to Baydoun et al. (2012), culture and religion are the two
essential elements that influence corporate governance in the region. He argues that the
adoption of international practice could be effective in the direction of a good corporate
governance system. In the same spirit, Shehata (2015) points that GCCs compared to the
wider region of Middle East North Africa countries (MENA), show greater convergence in
the international corporate governance standards.
Although the adoption of common governance principles remains a priority for
attracting investments, there is the common belief that an effective system of governance
should take into account the specific characteristics of each region (Buck and Shahrim
2005; Black et al. 2010; Al-Malkawi et al. 2014). Under this view, Bhatti and Bhatti (2010)
propose an Islamic corporate governance model, which combines both Sharia and OECD
principles.
Common governance principles form a familiar environment, which is the necessary
precondition for investments. Investors need understandable financial information to
make decisions. IFRS provide a common accounting language thus diminishing the
information costs among countries, reducing investors’ uncertainty, and enhancing the
reporting quality and the comparability of financial statements across countries. This is
crucial to encouraging international investments as well.
Many studies have recognized the significant positive effect of IFRS on increasing FDI
inflows across different economic and geographical peripheries (Márquez-Ramos 2011;
Gordon et al. 2012; Chen et al. 2014; Daskalopoulos et al. 2016; Kainth and Wahlstrøm
2021). However, the effect of IFRS adoption is dependent on the economic status of each
country. The developing countries gain much more FDI inflows than developed countries
by the adoption of IFRS (Gordon et al. 2012). This is because developing countries need
more international funds compared to developed countries, thus they should secure their
access to international institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. It is also supported by
the fact that investors’ expected returns are higher in emerging economies.
Although the common belief is that IFRS have a positive effect on international trade
and FDI, Nnadi and Soobaroyen (2015) provide contrary evidence for the African countries.
They find that institutional structures such as the legal system and the level of corruption
are more important factors than IFRS adoption for the FDI increase in these countries,
highlighting the primary role of the institutional and legal framework of a country. The
findings of (Nnadi and Soobaroyen 2015) reinforce the view that a de jure implementation
of IFRS is not sufficient to gain the benefits that the literature indicates.
The issue of compliance is crucial, as it determines the effectiveness of standards, and it
is associated with institutions of countries. Only the adoption of IFRS, without the full compliance of the disclosure requirements, reduces their efficacy (Hodgdon et al. 2008). Furthermore,
between countries with different legal regimes, the interpretation and implementation
of IFRS may be different (Márquez-Ramos 2011). Thus, the decision of IFRS adoption
presupposes some institutional arrangements and the isolated changes in accounting and
disclosure systems should be accompanied by simultaneous improvements in the country’s
institutions (Amiraslani et al. 2013).
Although GCC countries have been applying IFRS for decades, there are few studies
regarding the benefits of the IFRS adoption. Alsaqqa and Sawan (2013) investigate the
impact of IFRS in the UAE stock exchange and their findings reveal that the adoption of
IFRS has improved the quality of financial reporting. Apergis (2015) provides similar conclusions for the MENA countries. He points out that the level of financial reporting quality
may differ across countries due to the different institutional, economic, and regulatory
frameworks.
In terms of integration, empirical research indicates that IFRS adoption promotes
integration into capital markets (inter alia Covrig et al. 2007; Cai and Wong 2010). Alnodel (2014) shows that the adoption of IFRS by GCCs stock markets does not affect the
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integration into the capital market, explaining that some other institutional elements may
block the role of common accounting standards. Indeed, the lack of qualified accounting
professionals, the ineffectiveness of external auditors, the existing accountant and legal
framework, the organization of the financial market, and the lack of education on IFRS are
documented as factors that justify the noncompliance to IFRS in GCCs (Al-Shammari et al.
2008; Aljifri 2013; Hassan et al. 2014; Al-Mannai and Hindi 2015; Nurunnabi 2018).
All in all, governance, and accounting systems (as the IFRS) are supplementary.
Common principles of governance and accountancy guarantee understandability and
comparability and thus strengthen good cooperation and common legitimacy. The change
in the degree of the positive effect of governance and IFRS on the internationalization perspective of GCCs would be proof if these preconditions are fulfilled. Thus, our hypotheses
are formulated as follows:
Hypotheses 1 (H1). Institutional quality (macro corporate governance) does not positively affect
(on average) FDI inflows.
Hypotheses 2 (H2). IFRS adoption does not positively affect (on average) FDI inflows.
3. Methodology and Data Description
The full dataset contains annual panel data for six GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates), for the period 1996 to 2017.
Our goal is to investigate whether the governance and the adoption of IFRS encourage
FDI. Thus, our dependent variable is the natural log (Ln) of Foreign Direct Investment, net
inflows in current USD. We approximate corporate governance at the macro level using
the six variables proposed by Kaufmann et al. (2009) which measure the six dimensions of
governance. IFRS adoption (adifrs) is a dummy variable which equals 1 if a country has
adopted IFRS or 0 otherwise, in our model. Also, we investigate the level of infrastructure
development in the host countries through the number of telephones per 100 populations
(Asiedu and Lien 2011). Furthermore, we adopt the control variables GDP, GDP Growth,
GDP per capita to capture the dynamics of each market. Table A1 in Appendix A, presents
the variables considered in the analysis and data sources.
We report the descriptive statistical measures in Table 1. More precisely, Table 1 shows
the average, the median, the minimum and maximum values, standard deviation, and the
number of observations in the sample2 . Some interesting points arise from the statistics
of governance indicators. According to the description of Kaufmann et al. (2009), the
values range from −2.5 = weak to 2.5 = strong. All mean governance indicators are a little
more than zero indicating a moderate governance performance. The average value of the
voice and accountability indicator is negative, which indicates an austere and restrictive
social environment. As for the infrastructure variable, the average value shows good
infrastructure development in GCCs.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 1996–2017.
Variables

Mean

Median

Maximum

Minimum

Std. Dev.

Obs

LnFDI
ADIFRS
LnGDP
GROWTH
GDPPC
GE
COR
PV
RQ
RL
VA
PHONE

4,060,000,000
0.714286
163,000,000,000
5.13088
30,482.05
0.38779
0.45304
0.338202
0.418925
0.435359
−1.00049
106.74

1,290,000,000
1
106,000,000,000
4.410275
23,649.37
0.391808
0.390058
0.455153
0.473385
0.471937
−0.99983
118.3071

39,500,000,000
1
756,000,000,000
26.17025
88,564.82
1.509872
1.567186
1.223623
1.120548
0.958523
−0.24381
214.7349

−2,170,000,000
0
6,100,000,000
−7.0761
6254.953
−0.37478
−0.33115
−1.33542
−0.30826
−0.15068
−1.9072
0.670641

7,100,000,000
0.45
181,000,000,000
5.014516
19,839.45
0.415555
0.455451
0.64316
0.329536
0.242224
0.415364
57.68636

105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
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We investigated the possible effects of independent variables on FDI, implementing
three different panel models, fixed effect, random effect, and Arellano-Bond Estimator.
Each model reports results based on different assumptions thus results for these three
different models allowed us to compare them for robustness.
The fixed effect model investigates group differences in intercepts, assuming the same
slopes and constant variance across the cross-sections (countries). We considered this effect,
as it allowed us to capture unobserved heterogeneity across countries where it is fixed over
time. Equation (1) below presents our fixed effect model:
LnFDIit = ( a + ui ) + β 1 ADIFRSit + β 2 GORit + β 3 LnGDPit + β 4 GROWTHit + β 5 GDPPCit
(1)
+ β 6 GEit + β 7 PHONEit + β 8 PVit + β 9 RQit + β 10 RLit + β 11 VAit + ε it

where, cross-sections (countries) are expressed by i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and t is the time period,
that is, t = 1, 2, 3 . . . 22. Also, εi is the error term ε ∼ I ID O, σε2 , ui is a random variable
that is part of the intercept α under the fixed effects model and it is assumed that it is
uncorrelated with explanatory variables. Equation (1) is estimated by using a least squares
dummy variable (LSDV) estimator.
However, the fixed effect model does not allow for the variation across countries to
be random and uncorrelated with the dependent and independent variables included in
Equation (1). Thus, we estimate the random effects model, as well:
LnFDIit = a + β 1 ADIFRSit + β 2 GORit + β 3 LnGDPit + β 4 GROWTHit + β 5 GDPPCit + β 6 GEit
+ β 7 PHONEit + β 8 PVit + β 9 RQit + β 10 RLit + β 11 VAit + (ε it + uit )

(2)

In contrast with the fixed effect model, the random effect model gives estimates
variance components for countries and error, assuming the same intercepts and slopes. In
Equation (2), the random component ui is a part of the errors means that the difference
among the countries lies in their variance of the error term and not in their intercepts. The
random effects model is estimated by the GLS estimator.
A frequent phenomenon in economics is the dependence of a variable on its own
previous value. For such cases, autoregressive (AR) models are useful because they specify
that the dependent variable may be linearly determined on its own previous values and
describes certain time-varying processes. The following model expresses an autoregressive
process:
Yit = β 1 Yi,t−1 + β 2 Xit + uit
(3)
Some problems may arise from Equation (3) related to the endogeneity of variables
and to the error terms, as the fixed effects, which are contained in the error term, consist of
the unobserved country-specific effects and the observed specific errors, that is:
uit = uci + eit

(4)

The solution to such a problem is using the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions.
However, the existence of lagged dependent variable increases autocorrelation in the
model. The Arellano-Bond estimator solves these problems as transforms Equation (3) in
first differences:
∆Yit = β 1 ∆Yi,t−1 + β 2 ∆Xit + ∆uit
(5)
Because of Equation (4), the first differenced error term equals to ∆uit = eit − eit−1 ,
thus the fixed effects in the error terms are not time-varying.
Therefore, we estimate the following model in our case as below:
∆LnFDIit = ai + β 1 ∆LnFDIit−1 + β 2 ADIFRSit + β 3 ∆GORit + β 4 ∆LnGDPit + β 5 ∆GROWTHit
+ β 6 ∆GDPPCit + β 7 ∆GEit + β 8 ∆PHONEit + β 9 ∆PVit + β 10 ∆RQit + β 11 ∆RLit
+ β 12 ∆VAit + ∆uit

(6)
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4. Empirical Findings
In this section, we present the results of our model. At each stage of analysis, FDI
inflows represent the dependent variable, while the other variables are used as independent
regression variables.
The question that arises from a panel analysis is the choice of the most appropriate
model between fixed effect and random effect. This was answered using the Hausman test
(Hausman 1978), which reports the appropriate model for each case. The null hypothesis
of the test (H1) considers that the preferable model is that of random effect, while the
alternative hypothesis (H2) supports the fixed effect model. According to Table 2, the
Chi-Sq statistic value is 29.51 and the respective p-value is equal to 0.0010. Therefore, we
easily concluded that the fixed effect model is better for the current analysis, compared to
the random effect model. However, we still reported the random effect results as they are
not significantly different than those of fixed effect.
Table 2. Correlated Random Effects—Hausman Test.
Test Summary

Chi-Sq. Statistic

Prob.

Cross-section random

29.51

0.0010

Our results are presented in Table 3 The coefficient of determination R-squared (=0.52)
shows the variability rate of the dependent variable explained by the independent variables.
In this case, Foreign Direct Investment inflows are explained as 52% by the independent
variables (IFRS adoption, governance quality, GDP, GDP Growth, GDP per capita, and
infrastructures). The adjusted determinant, Adj R-squared (=0.46), is the same as the
R-squared, but it is adjusted by the number of cases and variables.
Table 3. Results of Fixed Effect, Random Effect, and Arellano-Bond Estimator.
Fixed Effects
Variables

Coef.

Std.
Err.

LnFDI L1
ADIFRS
COR
LnGDP
GROWTH
GDPPC
GE
PHONE
PV
RQ
RL
VA
constant

2.15
0.01
−1.51
0.06
0.00
0.49
0.01
1.08
−0.22
−1.99
0.18
55.11

0.51
0.49
0.83
0.03
0.00
0.83
0.01
0.53
0.67
0.83
0.98
19.49

Random Effect

t-Stat

p>t

4.23
0.03
−1.82
2.21
1.34
0.6
2.54
2.07
−0.33
−2.39
0.19
2.83

0
0.976
0.072
0.03
0.183
0.553
0.013
0.042
0.743
0.019
0.853
0.006

Arellano-Bond Estimator

Coef.

Std.
Err.

t-Stat

p>t

Coef.

Std.
Err.

t-Stat

p>t

1.06
−0.46
0.59
0.11
0.00
1.67
0.00
0.51
0.22
−2.60
−1.28
4.49

0.44
0.52
0.17
0.03
0.00
0.64
0.00
0.29
0.67
0.87
0.43
3.99

2.39
−0.89
3.47
3.81
−1.25
2.6
−0.18
1.72
0.330
−2.99
−2.99
1.12

0.017
0.374
0.001
0.00
0.211
0.009
0.853
0.085
0.741
0.003
0.003
0.261

0.31
1.42
1.63
−1.49
0.10
0.00
−0.61
0.01
0.25
−1.85
0.36
−0.79
48.52

0.1
0.50
0.72
0.88
0.02
0.00
0.90
0.01
0.52
0.86
0.98
0.99
21.22

3.06
2.86
2.26
−1.69
3.87
0.51
−0.67
1.30
0.48
−2.15
0.36
−0.80
2.29

0.00
0.00
0.02
0.09
0.00
0.61
0.50
0.19
0.63
0.03
0.72
0.42
0.02

Obs

98

98

R-squared

0.52

0.43

Arellano-Bond dynpandata
Number of obs
Number of groups

Adjusted R

0.46

0.64

Obs per group:

Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob. (F-statistic)

2491.94
8.24
0

0

Number of instruments
Wald chi2(12)
Prob> chi2

72
6
Min = 9
Avg = 12
Max = 15
73
95.82
0
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The H1 hypothesis is rejected both when the t-stat is larger than 1.96 (in absolute
values) and the p-value is larger than 0.05, in a 5%significance level. The t-stats are the
coefficients of regressions divided by their respective standard errors. We observe that
t-statistic for the adoption of IFRS (ADIFRS) is 4.23, indicating a strong positive and
significant impact on FDI. Therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis H1, meaning that
the adoption of IFRS positively affects foreign direct investments.
In addition, Growth is a statistically significant variable and has a positive effect on
FDI inflows (t-stat = 2.21 and p-value = 0.03). As for governance indicators, the fixed
effect model showed two indicators to be significant: the political stability and absence of
violence index (PV) and the rule of law index (RL).The impact of the former is positive
(t-stat = 2.07 and p-value = 0.042) and the impact of the latter is negative (t-stat = −2.39 and
p-value = 0.019) on FDI. Also, Infrastructure index positively and significantly affects FDI
(t-stat = 2.54 and p-value = 0.013).
The use of the random effect model has almost the same results as those of the fixed
effect method. Table 3 reports the relative results. We observed that t-statistic for the
adoption of IFRS (ADIFRS) is 2.39, indicating a strong positive and significant impact
on FDI. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis H1, meaning that the adoption of IFRS
positively affects foreign direct investment in the case of random effect also.
GDP and Growth are statistically significant variables and have a positive effect on
FDI inflows (t-stat = 3.47, p-value = 0.001 and t-stat = 3.81, p-value = 0.00, respectively).
Also, the governance indicators rule of law (RL) and voice and accountability (VA) have a
negative and significant effect on FDI, while the statistical power of these two indicators
is the same (t-stat equals −2.99 and p-value equals 0.003). However, the magnitude of
the effects differs (coefficient of RL equals −2.60 and of VA = −1.28), indicating that the
confidence in the rules of society has a greater effect than that of the freedoms.
The use of the Arellano-Bold estimator has almost the same results as those of the
fixed effect method. More precisely, the adoption of IFRS positively and significantly affects
FDI (t-stat equals 2.86 and p-value equals 0.10). Growth is the most important factor among
the other factors, while its impact is positive on FDI. Moreover, results show that both the
control of corruption (COR) and regulatory quality (RQ) are significant. The control of
corruption (COR) positively affects FDI while the influence of regulatory quality (RQ) is
significantly negative. Furthermore, the lagged FDI inflows (L1) are a strong determinant of
current FDI, meaning that a good performance in the previous FDI promotes current FDI.
5. Discussion
We employ three different panel models to specify the impact of the selected variables
on FDI. Our results show interesting insights on the adoption of IFRS and the governance
quality on FDI.IFRS are well established in the literature in terms of their effects both on the
micro and macro levels. We confirm a strong significant and positive effect between IFRS
and FDI, obtained by the three models that we have employed. This result is consistent
with the previous research (Márquez-Ramos 2011; Gordon et al. 2012; Chen et al. 2014;
Daskalopoulos et al. 2016).
Furthermore, the IFRS result highlights the trade interdependences across countries
asthe accounting convergence may be a precondition of economic relations (inter alia Irvine
2008; Ramanna and Sletten 2009). GCC countries have developed extensive cooperation
with the Western world, while the European Union is the greatest trade partner to them.
Regarding governance, our results indicate that governance is an influential factor for
promoting FDI inflows, a result consistent with Gani (2007) and Buchanan et al. (2012). Some
other points are interesting as well. The fixed effect results show a positive relationship
between political stability and FDI. The detected effect confirms the general view that
political uncertainty negatively affects economic growth (Aisen and Veiga 2013).
Furthermore, the Arellano model shows that the control of corruption is positive
and statistically significant, indicating that transparency enhances foreign investments.
According to the World Bank3 , the annual worldwide bribery is about USD 1 trillion, noting
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the extension of corruption internationally. Corruption costs not only money but also the
efficacy of an investment and more general in the overall economy. Investors do not care
so much about the level of corruption, but they avoid the uncertainty which a corrupt deal
encompasses, thus corruption may have an adverse impact on foreign direct investment
and net capital inflows (Lambsdorff 2003). Also, corruption should be considered because
it is associated with economic growth and its influence is much more than other public
administrative distortions such as bureaucracy (Papaconstantinou et al. 2013).
The coefficients of voice and accountability, regulatory quality, and rules of law are
negative and significant, indicating that restrictions on personal liberty, weak formulation,
and implementation of rules and policies are factors that prevent FDI. Kayalvizhi and
Thenmozhi (2018) find similar results for a set of emerging countries. These specific
variables are the basic infrastructure of a state, as they relate to fundamental principles,
such as equality and justice, which contribute to a sense of social and economic trust and
security.
On the other hand, we observe that the indicators relative to the confidence of implementation of the law and the rules and the control of the corruption seem to be more
important determinants than the others relative to political stability and social liberties.
More specifically, political stability has less impact than the other variables of governance
in terms of statistical significance and magnitude. We believe this result has the same
explanation as Slangen and Tulder (2009), who state that Kaufmann’s political stability
index measures the likelihood of a sudden regime change due to a terrorism or political
violence event. MNEs may pay little attention to this possibility in contrast with the other
five dimensions of governance that measure the current governance policies and actions
that directly influence investments.
Furthermore, results from fixed effect and Arellano models do not report some influence of voice and accountability index on FDI. We explain this result as evidence that the
social or political regimes neither attract nor extract FDI. Therefore, we consider this result
consistent with Li (2009) and Asiedu and Lien (2011).
What is more, our results indicate that GDP growth positively and significantly affects
FDI, indicating that international investors and MNEs prefer countries with economic
growth. Economic growth shows not only the dynamics of production but also a wellorganized product and money market. FDI promotes stock market development and thus
economic growth (Tsagkanos et al. 2019).
All in all, GCCs are a block of states that concentrates some special characteristics that
have an impact on their social and economic development as well. Notwithstanding their
idiosyncrasies, they are very open economies due to their oil exports. Their strategic plan
for economic diversification, which is needed, passes through FDI, both for funding such
investments and more importantly for gaining new knowledge and innovations. Under
this perspective, IFRS and governance quality may help attract investors.
6. Conclusions
This paper presents an empirical analysis of the location advantages for the GCC
countries, investigating the extent to which institutional factors may promote FDI. We
conduct a panel analysis, implementing three different models: (a) the Fixed Effect, (b) the
Random Effect, and (c) the Arellano-Bond Dynamic Model. The results clearly indicate
that the accounting system is a strong determinant that promotes FDI. More specifically, all
three models indicate that IFRS are the most essential factor that encourages FDI.
In relation to the governance quality, the results show that the specific topic of governance is associated with FDI. The confidence in the law and the control of corruption
negatively affects the FDI, the other governance indicators do not seem to have statistical
significance. All in all, we believe that our results on governance quality indicate that
GCCs have fulfilled a minimum level of governance pre-conditions relative to FDI.
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Moreover, we find that GDP growth positively and significantly affects FDI. This
result means that international investors and MNEs prefer countries with economic growth
because growth implies a well-organized market (Tsagkanos et al. 2019).
The results of this study have important economic implications. First, a better understanding of environments, such as the Gulf countries, is vital for international institutions,
investors, and policymakers. International institutions may help GCCs in the field of the
educational system to not only adopt IFRS but also implement them in a correct way. Also,
they may provide support to GCCs relative to the operation of public administration to
isolate distortions in the implementation of the rules. Furthermore, this paper may play
an informative role for investors as it provides evidence on FDI in GCCs. Policymakers of
GCCs may enhance their efforts into financial reforms, institutional quality, improvement
of the business environment to attract FDI and encourage international entrepreneurs
(Dkhili and Dhiab 2018; Hussain et al. 2021). Our study also provides some theoretical
insights to academic scholars interested in the determinants of FDI.
Finally, as regards the limitations, assessing the gradual impact of the adoption of IFRS
on the FDI inflows of countries is limited by the absence of a comprehensive theoretical
model for predicting the FDI inflows of countries. However, extensive empirical literature
examines the determinants of FDI inflows, and our study was based on this literature as
regards the gradual impact of IFRS on FDI inflows. Furthermore, the second limitation of
this study was that the available data on a country’s decision to adopt IFRS are incomplete.
Specifically, we do not know to what extent the firms within a country concede to all of the
principles of IFRS. Once the data become available, another interesting extension of this
study would be to examine the impact of IFRS adoption by a country not only considering
the overall FDI but by separately estimating the inflows of each FDI pattern.
Finally, how firms decide to invest in a country is certainly a complex issue that is
not limited to the infrastructures of a host country. Thus, one extension for future research
associated with the location advantages except the infrastructures may be the ability of
transnational relations to promote FDI. Also, the cultural differences between states could
be an interesting task for the research.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Variable description and data sources.
Variables Name

ID

Definition

Source

LnFDI

Natural logarithm of foreign direct investment inflow data in
current US dollars.

World Bank

Adoption of International
Financial Reporting
Standards

ADIFRS

A dummy variable equal to 1 if a country has adopted IFRS or 0
otherwise

https://www.iasplus.com/
en/resources/ifrs-topics/
use-of-ifrs (accessed on 20
October 2018)

Voice and Accountability

VA

It shows perceptions of which extent a country’s citizens are able
to participate in selecting their government, freedom of
expression, freedom of association, and free media. Range:
[−2.5(=weak), 2.5(=strong)]

Political Stability and
Absence of
Violence/Terrorism

PV

It captures insights into the likelihood that a government will be
destabilized or overturned by unconstitutional or violent means.
Range: [−2.5(=weak), 2.5(=strong)]

Government Effectiveness

GE

It captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the
quality of the civil service, and the degree of its independence
from political pressures. Range: [−2.5(=weak), 2.5(=strong)]

Regulatory Quality

RQ

It shows insights on the government ability to formulate and
implement strong policies and regulations that promote private
sector development. Range: [−2.5(=weak), 2.5(=strong)]

Rule of Law

RL

It indicates perceptions of which extent agents have confidence in
the rules of society Range: [−2.5(=weak), 2.5(=strong)]

Control of Corruption

COR

It captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is
exercised for private gain and the dependence of the state on
elites and private interests. Range: [−2.5(=weak), 2.5(=strong)]

GDP

LnGDP

Ln of GDP in current US dollars, capturing a market factor that
attracts FDI.

World Bank

GDP Growth

GROWTH

GDP growth measured by dividing normal GDP with current
year population, capturing a market factor that attracts FDI

World Bank

GDP per Capita

GDPPC

GDP per capita in current US dollars scaled by 1000, capturing a
labor cost factor that attracts FDI.

World Bank

Infrastructure Index

PHONE

The number of telephones per 100 population

World Bank

Foreign Direct Investment,
net inflows

The Worldwide Governance
Indicator database 2009
prepared by Daniel
Kaufmann, World Bank

Table A2. Results of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF).
Variable

VIF

1/VIF

GE

4.96

0.201675

COR

4.25

0.23522

PHONE

3.7

0.270074

RQ

3.58

0.279273

LnGDP

3.31

0.302512

GDPC

3.27

0.305384

RL

3.02

0.330785

ADIFRS

2.97

0.336163

PV

2.84

0.35175

VA

2.37

0.421355

GDPG

1.48

0.676979

Mean VIF

3.25

For identifying the degree of multicollinearity, in our model, we use Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). According
to Sheather (2009), a cutoff of 5 is mostly used, while, considering the rule of thumb that if VIF > 10, the
multicollinearity is high (Neter et al. 1996), no correlation between two explanatory variables is indicated by the
value of 1 and moderate correlation is indicated by a value between 1 and 5. In our model, no VIF values not
exceed the value of 5, indicating that there is no severe correlation.
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Table A3. Correlation Matrix.

LnFDI
ADIFRS
LnGDP
GDPC
GDPG
GE
PHONE
PV
RL
RQ
VA
COR

LnFDI

ADIFRS

LnGDP

GDPC

GDPG

GE

PHONE

PV

RL

RQ

VA

1
0.5358
0.6363
0.2043
0.1963
0.1239
0.5099
−0.0865
−0.3038
−0.0442
−0.6181
−0.0149

1
0.5403
0.3823
0.0389
−0.0045
0.7718
−0.2381
−0.1351
−0.0588
−0.4532
−0.1438

1
0.3895
−0.0364
−0.0014
0.5875
−0.0003
−0.214
−0.2971
−0.5104
0.0039

1
0.4117
0.4138
0.3102
0.4138
0.487
0.1137
0.0984
0.4714

1
0.1315
−0.0398
0.2368
0.2362
0.1138
0.0356
0.2838

1
0.0945
0.4516
0.586
0.7468
0.1399
0.7782

1
−0.3368
−0.1257
0.0285
−0.5112
−0.1116

1
0.5755
0.1994
0.4734
0.6529

1
0.5295
0.4604
0.6728

1
0.1364
0.5527

1
0.2985

COR

1

Notes
1
2

3

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a block of countries that includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates.
In addition, all the variables included in the panel models are tested for correlation. In Appendix A, Tables A2 and A3 present the
results of the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and the correlation matrix, respectively.In our model, no VIF values exceed the value
of 5, indicating that there is no severe correlation.
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20190295~menuPK:34457~pagePK:34370~piPK:3442
4~theSitePK:4607,00.html (accessed on 20 October 2018).
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